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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the current and potential 
applications of unmanned systems in military logistics. In seeking to evaluate 
uses of unmanned systems, initially, we aimed to define current and proposed 
unmanned applications in civilian-sector logistics and current military logistics 
challenges. Then, justifying uses of unmanned systems in the commercial sector 
and military, we analyzed the potential advantages and risks of these systems by 
using archival analysis and case studies. Finally, we addressed 
recommendations on the current and future uses of unmanned systems in 
military logistics.  
Unmanned technology is an area open to development. There has been 
extensive use of unmanned vehicles in military operations such as 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and armed attacks. Changing economic conditions 
and advances in technology indicate that there may also be opportunities to 
employ unmanned systems to support logistic operations.  
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Interaction therefore will be most frequent between strategy and 
matters of supply, and nothing is more common than to find 
considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign 
and a war. (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 75) 
Along with the dynamic character of science, technology is constantly 
changing and improving. Transformational improvements in science and 
technology are reflected in war. Throughout the history of humankind, the 
weapons used by militaries have evolved from swords and spears to firearms—
made possible by the invention of gunpowder and capable of much greater 
destruction. However, no resource is infinite—there are limits to supplies of 
weapons, ammunition, and personnel. Military commanders have come to 
understand that victory is closely related to having sufficient units, soldiers, 
weapons, and supplies at the right time and place—logistics, in other words, has 
become a critical part of military operations. Historically, superior logistical 
capabilities have given a competitive advantage to militaries.  
Around the turn of the 20th century, science reached a point at which 
humans could control machines from far distances (Singer, 2009). By this time, 
Thomas Edison and Nikola Tesla had significantly improved radio-control devices 
and wireless communication, which established a basis for unmanned systems 
(Singer, 2009). During the First World War, one of the first logistics applications of 
unmanned systems was implemented. Its name was the “electric dog.” It was a 
three-wheeled vehicle designed to carry supplies to the trenches by following the 
lights of a lantern (Singer, 2009). Without any doubt, it was born from the 
necessity of transporting essential logistical assets in a deadly environment 
created by the trench warfare concept. In the years since then, both logistics and 
unmanned applications have become increasingly important to militaries. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze both existing and potential uses 
of unmanned systems in logistics, focusing on the advantages and risks for 
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military organizations and operations. Considering the historical and potential 
benefits of unmanned technology in both civilian and military sectors, using this 
technology in military logistics would prove valuable in reducing costs, taking 
more risks with fewer casualties, increasing capacity, and speeding up delivery 
processes. Unmanned technology is an area open to development. This thesis 
intends to incorporate the studies and applications of current and potential 
technologies on the use of unmanned systems for logistical purposes. In addition 
to the strategic importance of unmanned systems for militaries, research and 
development for unmanned systems in the civilian sector has led to an incredible 
level of competition between huge industrial firms. During the writing of this thesis, 
ongoing research had to be updated several times to catch up with new emerging 
technologies, new regulations, and ethical discussions on unmanned systems. 
Because of the timeliness of this topic, the continuous need for updates was a 
limitation for this thesis. 
This research aims to address the following questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
 What are the current and potential uses of unmanned systems for 
military logistics? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 What are the current and potential applications of unmanned 
systems in civilian sector logistics? 
 How would the use of unmanned vehicles impact the acquisition 
cost of products compared to other delivery methods?  
 What are the advantages and risks of using unmanned systems in 
military logistics? 
The term unmanned systems identifies a broad topic composed of several 
applications, including unmanned industrial applications, unmanned aerial 
systems (UASs), unmanned ground systems (UGSs), unmanned surface systems 
(USSs), unmanned underwater systems (UUSs), unmanned space applications 
and autonomous cyber applications. The scope of this thesis is limited to 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents relevant background information about military 
logistics; there are significant studies and several cases about unmanned 
technology and unmanned logistics applications in the civilian sector. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to define common problems in military logistics and 
possible civilian unmanned logistics applications that can also be used to fill 
potential gaps in military logistics. 
A. BACKGROUND 
If the tools of warfare are no longer tanks and artillery, but rather 
computer viruses and micro-robots, then we can no longer say that 
nations are the only armed groups or that soldiers are the only ones 
in possession of the tools of war. (Toffler & Toffler, 1993, p. 45) 
To define the potential uses of current and potential applications of 
unmanned systems in military logistics, existing literature was collected and 
compiled under the following categories: unmanned systems and technology, 
current and proposed applications of unmanned systems in civilian sector 
logistics, and military logistics. To contribute to the conversation on the potential 
uses of unmanned systems in military logistics, it is important to understand the 
general framework of future military logistics and the relationship between the 
civilian and military sectors.  
In his thesis, McCoy (2002) highlighted Joint Military Vision 2020 as an 
important framework for the military in its preparations for future operations. It is 
easy to predict that future operations will be increasingly risky thanks to the hybrid 
nature of military theaters all around the world. Operations will be held in difficult 
terrains and will involve many new concepts like irregular warfare. According to 
McCoy (2002), 
The overall goal of Joint Military Vision 2020 transformation is the 
creation of a force dominant across the full spectrum of military 
operations. The Joint Military Vision 2020 strategy will develop a 
new level of joint interoperability, including a force that accepts, 
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expects, and encourages cross-service interdependence and 
operational integration. Joint Military Vision 2020 also expects new 
dimensions in robotics to dramatically increase the capability of the 
2020 joint task force over what is available today. (p. 2) 
McCoy (2002) also mentioned the term focused logistics, which is an 
important concept in Joint Military Vision 2020, and focuses on the necessity of 
delivering logistics goods on time to the related units, especially in risky terrains. 
Piggee (2002) emphasized the importance of incorporating both military 
and civilian technologies into more efficient and capable ones. Mainly, the private 
sector focuses on achieving the most effective and profitable outcomes with the 
least cost. This goal is also an important target for military logistics professionals 
(Piggee, 2002).  
History has shown that some disruptive technologies have been driven by 
civilian scientists. On the other hand, during other time periods, military inventions 
have driven innovations in human history. This research is mainly focused on a 
comparative analysis of both civilian and military technological advances—as well 
as the implications and effects that each has on the other—to discover best 
practices in the fulfillment of military efficiency goals 
B. MILITARY LOGISTICS 
1. Overview 
In his study, Kress (2016) defined logistics as 
a discipline that encompasses the resources that are needed to 
keep the means of the military process (operation) going in order to 
achieve its desired outputs (objectives). Logistics includes planning, 
managing, treating, and controlling these resources. (p. 7)  
Kress (2016) came up with three logistics options:  
 Obtain: Troops obtain the necessary supplies for military operations 
from the operational area.  
 Carry: Troops carry their supplies with themselves to the campaign.  
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 Ship: Necessary supplies can be sent to the troops from a rear 
facility.  
Obtaining and carrying choices were the main logistics options up until the 
middle of the 19th century in the absence of significant mass transportation 
options (Kress, 2016). With the Industrial Revolution, the shipping option started 
to gain importance, particularly with the use of trains in military logistics (Kress, 
2016). After the Industrial Revolution, the Logistics Revolution occurred in the 
20th century with the help of different factors that affected military logistics (Kress, 
2016).  
According to Kress (2016), specifically, the emergence of ammunition and 
fuel as a necessity for troops in military campaigns has paved the way to the 
Logistics Revolution. He explained the relationship as follows: Mankind invented 
automatic machine-guns and other kinds of weapons, so they needed to carry 
more and different kinds of ammunition. As the ammunition technology has 
evolved with new weapon technologies, troops could not carry this ammunition 
with them, and the need for shipping supplies from rear depots occurred. Another 
factor Kress (2016) mentioned was the emergence of mechanized weapon 
systems. This has paved the way for the usage of fuel in the battlefield. Fuel has 
become a critical logistic element as well as ammunition, both of which must be 
shipped from rear (Kress, 2016). In addition, the need for technical expertise and 
support has become a necessity with technical improvements on military logistics 
(Kress, 2016). 
Kress (2016) emphasized the importance of having a secure and 
uninterrupted line of communication (LOC) between the troops of the front and 
logistics facilities at the rear to implement an effective shipping option. Flowing 
information between troops and rear bases is also important, because of the 
uncertainties and fog of war (Kress, 2016). In addition to securing LOCs and 
effective information flows, another necessity is the presence of secure routes for 
carrying huge amounts of resources from the rear facilities. Blocks or lack of 
coordination on the routes of logistical convoys might have a slowing effect on 
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military operations. The absence of logistical support might create problems such 
as lack of supplies and maintenance (Kress, 2016). Obviously, more technical 
weapon systems necessitate more maintenance and logistics support than others 
(Kress, 2016). 
Although sending supplies from rear bases seems the most advantageous 
option, modern logistics necessitates a proper mix of all three options (Kress, 
2016). Obtaining logistics needs from the host nation’s resources might prove 
more effective at times. As an example, during the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia 
provided resources to coalition forces (Kress, 2016). Carrying supplies has also 
been an option, especially when troops need to conduct military operations 
continuously. During Operation Desert Shield, troops sustained their needs during 
the first stages of the operation (Kress, 2016). Finally, sending supplies has been 
a sine qua non in maintaining a continuous military operation (Kress, 2016). A 
logistics planner should consider all options and come up with a plan of well-
chosen options.  
2. Levels of Logistics and Functions of Each Level  
Like any hierarchical organization, it is appropriate to have three levels in 
military logistics organizations (Kress, 2016). As discussed earlier, there is a 
strategic level making the big investment decisions in commercial companies or 
military organizations. According to these strategic investments and operational 
decisions made by high and mid-level managers, smaller units conduct their 
specific smaller (tactical) tasks. Operational level (executers) bridges the gap 
between strategic and tactical levels. The presence of three levels of logistics can 
also be criticized. While it can be true that recent advances in information 
technology have revolutionized logistics and also blurred the traditional distinction 
between three levels, it is also a fact that there are still distinct differences 
between these levels worth considering separately (Kress, 2016). In parallel with 
three levels of war, logistics also has been divided into three categories: strategic, 
operational, and tactical logistics (Kress, 2016). 
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a. Strategic Logistics 
High-level defense-related decisions having long-term effects are made by 
strategic-level commands (Kress, 2016). These decisions include “research and 
development (R&D) investments, procurement and replenishment policies, and 
decision issues related to the physical infrastructure” (Kress, 2016, p. 17). 
According to Kress (2016), within the context of strategic logistics, typical 
problems of logistic infrastructure have two stages: 
1. Deciding the best proportion of assets within a logistics 
infrastructure. 
2. Distributing the limited budget between different logistics 
infrastructures. 
Obviously, economic issues have serious impacts on military logistics. 
Economic constraints affect both the force structure and logistic constraints 
(Kress, 2016). Figure 1 represents the dilemma between building the force and 
logistics constraints in strategic level (Kress, 2016).  
 
Figure 1.  Economic and Logistic Constraints. Source: Kress (2016). 
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b. Operational Logistics 
It is the utilization of logistics assets that are collected as a result of the 
strategic level of logistics such as resources, organizations, and processes, as an 
input for tactical needs (Kress, 2016).  
According to Kress (2016), operational logistics includes six major 
functions: 
1. Force accumulation: Mobilizing and locating the forces especially 
before the campaign is crucial in operational-level. Force 
accumulation includes routing, scheduling, and prioritization. 
 Routing: During the force accumulation process, it is important to 
select appropriate routing and “maintain a flow of military assets on 
the external line of communications (LOCs) that connect the source 
nodes at the strategic logistics level with the intermediate nodes at 
the operational level” (Kress, 2016, p. 43).    
 Prioritizing: It is assigning the order of units that will be sent to the 
operational theater. “The main factor in determining this order is 
operational. It is derived from the military posture, the objectives of 
the campaign, and the operational plans” (Kress, 2016, p. 43).    
 Scheduling: Depending on the priority, it is also necessary to 
schedule the dispatch of transportation assets including ships, 
aircrafts, trains, or vehicles considering operational plans. 
2. Deployment of resources: It involves defining “logistic nodes such as 
ports of debarkation, supply points, ammunition dumps, 
maintenance areas, transfer points, combat service support (CSS) 
units and facilities, and selecting the corresponding LOCs—roads, 
railways, air routes, and sea-lanes” (Kress, 2016, pp. 45-46). 
3. Logistic forecasting: In addition to the logistic planning before the 
operations, it is also possible that force size and structure might 
change in parallel with the operational plans. To be able to respond 
these shifts promptly, conducting effective logistic forecasting is a 
crucial factor. Logistic forecasting is also an ongoing process that 
facilitates moving to a new stage of operations efficiently and on 
time.  
4. Management and control of the logistic flow: To be able to manage 
the logistic movement of material/services and distribute them 
efficiently, it is crucial to conduct an effective and well-coordinated 
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logistic supply chain. It is also important to optimize limited 
transportation resources and their capacities.  
5. Medical treatment and evacuation: They are directly related to 
human life. Also, time is so crucial for medical help at the battlefield. 
Because of that, despite its relatively small scale, medical treatment 
and evacuation are considered as an operational logistic mission. 
6. Prioritization: Commanders set prioritization with logisticians during 
the planning phase of operations. It affects the amount and order of 
material deployed in operational terrain. It also affects the 
distribution and allocation of these resources (Kress, 2016).  
c. Tactical Logistics 
According to Kress (2016), “tactical logistics comprises basic and practical 
activities that facilitate the “production” of military outcomes” (p. 23). Tactical 
logistics is sustaining the units at a tactical level with necessary supplies such as 
weapons, ammunition, fuel, rations, and providing services like maintenance and 
medical aid. These supplies and services can easily be measured by specific 
metrics, because of their prescriptive and technical features (Kress, 2016).  
The main logistics activities at the tactical level are replenishing 
ammunition, refueling, maintenance, supplying personal needs (including rations), 
immediate medical aid and medical evacuation, treating “prisoners of war” 
(POWs) and civilians, some construction and engineering services (Kress, 2016). 
After defining three levels of logistics, it would be useful to define common 
logistics challenges and needs. It would also facilitate this research’s efforts on 
finding unmanned solutions to these logistics problems.     
3. Military Logistics Challenges 
In her article, Harps (2005) emphasized that although military and civilian 
logistics usually have common difficulties such as tracking, moving, inventory 
holding, and visibility, these two sectors diverge from each other when it comes to 
their goals. She mentioned that while business logistics consider profitability in 
their logistics operations, military logistics consider survival and ability to perform 
in every condition. In her article, she also included remarks by Rear Admiral Marc 
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L. Purcell, director of strategy, plans, policy, and programs for the U.S. 
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). According to him, another big difference 
between business and military logistics is that military conducts logistics 
operations in hostile areas and supports troops on the move. Obviously, carrying 
out military logistics operations in terrains that are exposed to the enemy would 
cause security challenges and bigger uncertainties that can disrupt operational 
effectiveness. In parallel with these opinions, Kang (2016) also defined challenges 
of military logistics in two main areas: uncertainty and security. Sharing all these 
opinions, we considered Kang’s (2016) view on the classification of military 
challenges.   
a. Uncertainty 
In his book, Kress (2016) points out that while strategic logistic decisions 
focus on efficiency, the tactical level of logistic decisions mainly focuses on 
effectiveness. Within the scope of effectiveness, tactical logistic decisions are 
based on minimizing the quantity gap of desired logistic assets and time gap of 
when actually troops have those assets (Kress, 2016).  
These shortcomings bring the term “uncertainty” into play. Perhaps the 
biggest challenge for logistics has been uncertainty since earlier times because 
uncertainty increases risk. Clausewitz (2007) mentioned “fog of war” in the same 
meaning with uncertainty in his reference book On War. He emphasized that 
uncertainty is part of the nature of war (Clausewitz, 2007). According to 
Clausewitz (2007), “war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors 
on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser 
uncertainty” (p. 46). In considering the logistic network of operations, it would be 
easy to predict that uncertainty has an overall effect on all levels of logistics. 
Kress (2016) mentioned the level of uncertainty increases from the strategic level 
of logistics to tactical level of logistics. This is mostly because while strategic 
logistics can be characterized by standardization and uniformity, tactical logistics 
is more variable due to the unpredictable nature of battlefield (Kress, 2016).  
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Civilian logistic managers also have the same problem, except with a 
different name: visibility. The efficiency of commercial supply chains is tied to the 
visibility of the supply chain. Finally, more uncertainty necessitates holding more 
inventory, and more inventory holding causes more money spending (Kang, 
2016).  
Kang (2016) classified the main reasons for uncertainty into three 
categories: fluctuations in supply/demand, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks.   
b. Security 
As discussed before, security would be an important issue for military 
logistics operations, because they are being conducted in hostile terrains, which 
are open to enemy disruption. Another security threat for military logistics is the 
irregular warfare and emerging terrorist groups. So, even if military logistics 
facilities, convoys, or supply chain elements are considered to be in safe areas, 
including the homeland, they can still be attacked. Kang (2016) classified security-
related challenges under physical (airport/seaport, transportation network) and 
information security/assurance headings.       
Within the scope of this thesis, the Analysis chapter discusses these 
military logistics challenges and seeks efficient unmanned solutions considering 
both military and business applications.    
C. UNMANNED SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Because unmanned systems and their technology are the focus of this 
research, it is important to begin the literature review section with a definition of 
unmanned systems. During this research, we found that researchers have used 
different terms for what we call “unmanned systems.” These terms include 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), unmanned 
sea vehicles (USVs), autonomous systems, robots, and drones. 
The Oxford Dictionary provided a variety of definitions for the terms 
mentioned here. Unmanned means not having or needing a crew or staff 
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(“Unmanned,” n.d.). Autonomous means acting independently or having the 
freedom to do so (“Autonomous,” n.d.). Robot means a machine capable of 
carrying out a complex series of actions automatically, especially one 
programmable by a computer (“Robot,” n.d.). A drone means remote-controlled 
pilotless aircraft or missile (“Drone,” n.d.). 
To identify the differences between these terms and use them in the 
correct context, we searched existing literature and tried to find some 
explanations and comparisons about these terms. In his reference book for 
unmanned aerial vehicles, Springer (2013) clarified some of these terms by 
providing comparisons among them. He explained that if a vehicle does not carry 
an operating human being, then it can be called unmanned. Therefore, unmanned 
aerial vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, and unmanned sea vehicles are 
rooted in the same terminology. According to Springer (2013), various definitions 
of robot have this in common: that at least some level of decision-making activity 
must occur for an object to be defined as a robot. Drones, on the other hand, do 
not make independent decisions. They fulfill programmed tasks with or without 
human control (Springer, 2013). Springer defined both drones and robots as 
robotic. Robotic systems may have different levels of autonomous performing 
ability. Recent unmanned systems practices and applications have not been fully 
designed to be autonomous yet. At least a small human interaction exists in them 
(Springer, 2013).  
Rogers and Hill (2014) used the term drones for UAVs. They also used the 
term robota, which means “self labour, and drudgery” (p. 120). To improve 
economic and mission efficiency, scientists and officials have tried to increase the 
level of drones’ autonomy (Rogers & Hill, 2014). 
The National Research Council (2005) explained that if an unmanned 
system has some level of autonomy built in, it can be called autonomous. Then, 
they decided to use autonomous vehicles for all the unmanned systems that do 
not have a human onboard. According to the National Research Council (2005), 
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in defining “autonomous vehicles” for purposes of this study, the 
Committee on Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations 
elected to include all vehicles that do not have a human onboard. 
This definition is broad enough to include weapons systems such as 
torpedoes, mobile mines, and ballistic and cruise missiles—although 
these systems are not discussed in this report. Space vehicles are 
also not discussed, although the applications of space such as 
enhanced command, control, and communications (C3) are 
discussed for their role in enabling autonomous vehicles. (National 
Research Council, 2005, p. 1) 
Within the scope of this study, the term unmanned systems is used as a 
general term for all UAVs, UGVs, and USVs, while the term robotic systems is 
used to identify any kind of system in which decision-making abilities are a part of 
the system’s computing capabilities. 
D. CURRENT AND PROPOSED APPLICATIONS OF UNMANNED 
SYSTEMS IN CIVILIAN SECTOR LOGISTICS 
Up until recently, militaries all around the world have been the leader in 
unmanned and robotic technology. Governments have supported comprehensive 
research and have generously funded projects for military purposes to gain a 
competitive advantage over other countries. As a result of these efforts, 
unmanned technology has undergone major developments within the defense 
sector, leading to the invention of many kinds of unmanned systems—with and 
without weapons.  
The civilian sector has also seen a dramatic rise in unmanned and robotic 
technologies in logistics over the last few years. A critical question comes to mind: 
Why have robotic technologies become a rising trend for commercial firms? In his 
report, Bonkenburg (2016) explained this trend by pointing out two factors: rising 
demand for logistics workers and labor availability to fulfill this need. These two 
important factors are closely related to each other (Bonkenburg, 2016). In a 
standard supply chain system, products, which are produced or combined 
together in the factories, are packed and sent to the warehouses and then to the 
retailers. Customers purchase goods from the nearest retailers. On the other 
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hand, with the emerging e-commerce system, products have been sent from 
warehouses or distribution centers directly to customers (in some cases, from 
factories directly to the customers). In either method, workers pick and sort the 
items in the warehouse to fulfill each order coming from the customers on time. 
Then workers find each item and prepare it for shipment. This significantly 
increases the need for more workers in warehouses or in distribution centers. 
Bonkenburg (2016) highlighted that, thanks to increasing e-commerce trends, 
more logistics workers are needed for preparing parcel shipments. He also 
emphasized the decreasing population levels in Western countries.  
Atwater and Jones (2004) described another approach focusing on labor 
shortages. According to these researchers, the industrial world will suffer a 
systemic labor shortage. The three primary reasons they gave for the systemic 
labor shortages were that there will be increased needs for productivity, significant 
demographic changes, and changes in labor force participation trends (Atwater & 
Jones, 2004). In their research, Atwater and Jones (2004) analyzed these three 
reasons for systemic changes and drew significant conclusions. First of all, they 
expect a dramatic increase in the United States’ demographic structure, especially 
“in the number of Americans over the age of 65” (Atwater & Jones, 2004, para. 6); 
this shift leads them to conclude that numbers of consumers will grow faster than 
producers (Atwater & Jones, 2004). They also stated that expected participation 
rates for men and women will be equal, and productivity needs will rise 
dramatically in the upcoming years.  
These lines of thought and industrial trends in the logistics world lead some 
commercial companies to seek a way to prevent inefficiencies resulting from labor 
losses. Therefore, these commercial companies have started to substitute 
workers with robotic systems to decrease their costs.  
We also found it useful to mention the Google Self-Driving Car Project as 
an example of significant advances in unmanned systems here. In 1939, “a vision 
of automated highways” (Google, 2016, para. 2) were presented to the audience 
at the New York World’s Fair. “Then in the mid-2000s, the Defense Advanced 
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Research Project Agency (DARPA) organized the Grand Challenges” (Google, 
2016, para. 2). It was a chance for teams to compete in self-driving car technology 
(Google, 2016). “In 2009, Google initiated the self-driving car project” (Google, 
2016, para. 2) and recently they have been testing this technology in California; 
Texas; Washington, DC; and Arizona with both “Lexus Sport Utility Vehicles 
(SUVS) and new prototype vehicles” (Google, 2016, para. 3–4). This project also 
had pushing effect on the car industry and other leading companies such as 
Tesla. 
In this thesis, common uses and possible trends of current civilian 
unmanned applications are grouped into two sub-categories: industrial robots at 
warehouses/distribution centers and deliveries with unmanned systems.   
1. Industrial Robots at Warehouses / Distribution Centers 
According to Dineen (2015), robotic industrial solutions are gaining pace 
“throughout Asia, Europe, and the United States” (para. 11). As an example of 
industrial robot usage, Dineen (2015) highlighted the Rethink Robotics Company 
and the Kiva Systems. Rethink Robotics Company has been providing cost-
saving industrial solutions to U.S. factories (Dineen, 2015). On the other hand, 
Amazon’s acquisition of Kiva Systems has been a remarkable effect on the 
robotics industry.    
a. Kiva Systems and Amazon Warehouses 
Kiva Systems—a Massachusetts company founded in 2003—has 
introduced “robotic solutions to warehouses for picking, packing and shipping 
products” (Dineen, 2015, para. 2). Since the company’s establishment, it has had 
dramatic effects on warehouse automation solutions. In 2009, according to Inc. 
500, Kiva Systems was the sixth fastest growing company in the United States, 
and in 2012, it was the 23rd most innovative company, according to Fast 
Company rankings (Dineen, 2015).   
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Amazon, one of the top e-commerce companies in the world, bought Kiva 
Systems Company for $775 million in 2012 (Dineen, 2015). Although Amazon’s 
robotic warehouses have been considered the most well-known success story by 
the industry, some other companies, including Walgreens, Staples, Gap, and 
Crate & Barrel, had already been using Kiva robots when Amazon acquired them 
(Dineen, 2015). After the acquisition of Kiva Systems, Amazon stopped the sale of 
Kiva Systems to other warehouse operators and retailers (Bhasin & Clark, 2016). 
Kiva Systems had 25 existing customers by the time Amazon bought the 
company, and as of 2019, Amazon will not provide service support for those 
companies (Borison, 2016). After the existing contracts ended, other firms had to 
find other alternatives to catch up with the growing customer demands (Bhasin & 
Clark, 2016). Borison (2016) mentioned that there are other firms trying to fill the 
gap in warehouse automation technologies, including Locus Robotics, Home 
Delivery Services, Toyota Motor, “Kuka, Knapp Logistics Automation, AutoStore, 
Swisslog, Dematic, Fetch Robotics, and GreyOrange” (Borison, 2016, para. 30).  
Amazon established a robotic system in its warehouses with the Kiva 
robots, which are basically programmed robots that move on a designated path in 
the warehouse and find their direction with the help of barcodes (Dineen, 2015). 
They find and carry racks loaded with merchandise to a single workstation and 
point out the required merchandise to the responsible worker. This operation of 
Kiva robots has helped Amazon significantly improve its fulfillment speed and 
capacity and decrease employment costs, as well (Dineen, 2015). Amazon 
established a new division called Amazon Robotics and started operating Kiva 
robotics technology under this division (Borison, 2016). Amazon had 15,000 
robots at the end of 2014 in its 10 fulfilment centers, and this number rose to 
30,000 recently in 13 fulfillment centers (Borison, 2016).  
Amazon’s big investment has been paying off, dropping its operating 
expenses by 20% at its fulfillment centers (Lamm, 2016). An analysis by Deutsche 
Bank determined that adding this new robotic technology to a new warehouse 
saves approximately $22 million in fulfillment expenses. By that estimate, about 
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100 Amazon distribution centers would save approximately $2.5 million by 
instituting robotic technology (Bhasin & Clark, 2016). In addition, consulting firm 
MWPVL International calculated that Amazon saved 21.3 cents per unit shipped 
(or 48% of costs) by eliminated the hours wasted in walking around warehouses 
to pick up products (Borison, 2016).  
Moreover, this improved robotic process has dropped Amazon’s cycle-time 
from over an hour to 15 minutes and has increased inventory space by 50%, 
because robots can navigate in narrower aisles in warehouses. Most importantly, 
these improvements have enabled Amazon’s two-day shipping advantage for its 
Amazon Prime members (Lamm, 2016). Another benefit of Kiva robots is the 
ability to adjust warehouse lights and climate controls where Kiva robots operate 
(Madrigal, 2009). Normally, warehouse operators must have bright enough lights 
and comfortable climate conditions for human workers, but these are not 
necessary for Kiva robots (Madrigal, 2009). Hence, that leads to an approximately 
50% energy cost savings where Kiva robots operate (Madrigal, 2009).   
According to Dineen (2015), some companies like Fanuc America intend to 
manufacture smarter and faster robots that can spot the merchandise, pick it up, 
and package it. Dineen (2015) further explained that Fanuc America was the 
sponsor of the Amazon Picking Challenge, in which teams from different 
universities competed with their robots in order to pick items from the shelves to 
test their robots’ speed and ability. 
b. Walmart Warehouses  
Abrams (2016) also highlighted Walmart’s efforts to test flying drones in 
order to handle the inventory level in its warehouses. According to Abrams, if 
these experiments prove to be effective, Walmart will implement this system of 
drones to its big distribution centers in six to nine months. Abrams (2016) also 
stated that Walmart officials mentioned generally that drones might be used in 
some other processes within Walmart in the short term.   
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2. Unmanned Systems Delivery 
Huge commercial companies like Amazon, Google, and Deutsche Post 
DHL Group (DPDHL) are researching unmanned systems delivery technology. 
Research and news about unmanned system delivery have put the use of drone 
delivery in the spotlight, creating an increasing interest in this kind of futuristic 
technology. Recent applications of unmanned systems in civilian sector logistics 
focus on UAVs. 
The first UAV applications with a military purpose were clearly intended to 
create a force multiplier for their operators and home country. According to 
DPDHL’s trend report, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Logistics (DHL, 2014), most 
people have negative feelings toward the term “drone” because of past 
perceptions and because of the most recent, improved, and lethal uses of drones 
for military purposes. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Logistics (DHL, 2014) pointed 
out important factors about civilian uses of UAVs over the next 10 years. This 
report used Larry Downes’ famous theory to explain future trends, explaining that 
technological changes generally occur before the social and political changes—
with social changes occurring slowly and political changes taking even more time.   
The report mentioned that it is likely to take some time before drone 
delivery becomes a disruptive innovation, because there is a significant speed 
difference between changes in drone technology and other domains that are 
subjected to social, business, and political shifts (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Larry Downes’ Law of Disruption. Source: DHL (2014). 
In the same trend report, military UAVs were classified into different types 
according to their capabilities and task purposes, like ranges and endurances. 
The report explained the broad range of possible applications that were being 
used in different kinds of civilian industry practices. These applications include the 
following: “energy/infrastructure, agriculture and forestry, site and layout planning; 
construction sector, environmental protection, emergency response and police, 
film and photography, development aid” (DHL, 2014, p. 2). In addition, the trend 
report mentioned interesting implications of the uses of UAVs in logistics with an 
increase in e-commerce, as mentioned previously in this thesis. Other than urban 
or rural delivery, a customer might send a notification to the UAV hub to request a 
specific place for delivery, and a UAV might carry the delivery to that exact place 
(DHL, 2014). Another implication is the use of UAVs on top of delivery trucks. 
When an employee within a truck places a delivery in a specific place that the 
UAV can identify, the UAV scans the barcode and leaves with the parcel to find 
the specific address. This address may be off the main route being followed by 
the truck, and after leaving the package, the UAV returns and places itself on top 
of the moving delivery truck again to get ready for another delivery (DHL, 2014).     
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Amazon, the world’s largest online retailer, has been one of the leading 
companies making investments in drone delivery. Pogue (2016) interviewed Paul 
Misener, Amazon’s vice president for public policy. Pogue revealed many 
important details about Amazon’s Prime Air project and insights into UAV delivery. 
According to Pogue (2016), different kinds of circumstances—like weather 
conditions (for example, wet, hot, dusty) and building types that customers live 
in—necessitate different kinds of drones. Another problem that Amazon has to 
face is the regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other 
regulators around the world. According to Pogue (2016), Amazon has proposed to 
use a certain part of the airspace between 200 and 400 feet. Amazon and the 
FAA are still negotiating over the regulations of using commercial UAVs, and it is 
likely that this technology will be used in other countries before the United States, 
depending on the length of negotiations with the FAA (Pogue, 2016).    
Along with Amazon, other commercial companies have been working on 
drone delivery. Madrigal’s (2014) article revealed that Google has also been 
researching drone delivery systems (Project Wing). It is possible that Google will 
face the same kind of regulation issues, but with one difference: Madrigal (2014) 
posited that Google would have a deeper influence over the drone delivery issue, 
considering its success in dealing with regulators on its driverless car project. 
Bermingham’s (2014) article showed that FedEx has also been researching drone 
delivery technology since 2014. 
According to Prigg (2014), research is ongoing on the uses of UAVs for 
emergencies. Prigg stated that ambulance drones can track emergency mobile 
calls and move towards the place where help is needed. This kind of ambulance 
drone can carry defibrillators to people having cardiac arrest. They can also watch 
and talk with people who use the defibrillator in order to help deliver first aid. 
In his article, Toor (2016) reported that a Silicon Valley startup company, 
Zipline International, has started medicine and blood deliveries with UAVs in 
Rwanda. Rwanda has a poor population and high infant mortality, and the 
Rwandan government has invested in the healthcare system to decrease 
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unhealthy conditions and to combat the spread of dangerous illnesses such as 
HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, and others. Zipline International has begun UAV 
operations in partnership with the Rwandan government.   
Another current application was Uber’s unmanned truck and its first 
delivery test was proved successful (Davies, 2016). Uber bought Otto Company, a 
San Francisco startup, for $680 million last year (Davies, 2016). According to 
Davies (2016), Otto’s system established at the truck was level-four autonomy, 
which means it can handle the driving experience totally by itself. However, Uber 
started using this technology only on highways for now. Davies (2016) highlighted 
that “the trucking industry hauls 70% of the nation’s freight—about 10.5 billion 
tons annually—and simply doesn’t have enough drivers. The American Trucking 
Association pegs the shortfall at 48,000 drivers, and says it could hit 175,000 by 
2024” (Davies, 2016, para. 11). In addition, with the help of autonomous trucks, 
roads would be safer, more efficient, and cleaner with lower level of emission 
rates (Davies, 2016). 
E. CONCLUSION 
By the end of our literature review, we found that there have been 
considerable improvements in the use of unmanned systems in logistics within the 
civilian sector. Current civilian improvements for unmanned systems rely on aerial 
delivery and warehouse / factory logistics. Competition among giant logistics 
companies might drive the research into further advanced applications.  
Dynamic improvements have been made in unmanned systems 
technology. The strong competition among companies in the civilian sector has 
driven these developments, and military applications of these same technologies 
are likely to be affected by the fast pace of change; thus, the military will likely 
need to reevaluate the technology to stay up to date. In this thesis, our main 
intention is to contribute to the conversation on uses of unmanned systems in 
military logistics by analyzing some current cases that have been implemented by 
civilian companies and military institutions. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
With their complexity and high costs, unmanned systems necessitate 
detailed planning and evaluation before implementation, especially in military 
applications. Unlike commercial applications, the military requires additional 
durability, adaptability, and reliability in dangerous tasks. Systems should be 
durable enough to be sustainable during harsh terrains. They should be adaptable 
to other military technologies and weapons. Additionally, they should be reliable 
so they can support military operations continuously. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze both existing and potential uses 
of unmanned systems in both commercial and military logistics focusing on the 
advantages and risks for military organizations and operations. In seeking to 
evaluate and analyze uses of unmanned systems, we aimed to address the 
following primary research question: What are the current and potential uses of 
unmanned systems for military logistics? To answer this primary research 
question, we addressed the following three secondary research questions:  
 What are the current and potential applications of unmanned 
systems in civilian sector logistics? 
 How would the use of unmanned vehicles impact the acquisition 
cost of products compared to other delivery methods?  
 What are the advantages and risks of using unmanned systems in 
military logistics?  
Considering these research questions, we adopted a technology benefit 
analysis supported with archival analysis and multiple case studies embedded in 
our thesis to define the potential uses of unmanned systems for military logistics.  
A. TECHNOLOGY BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Jones (2006) described the technology benefit analysis as a method of 
defining supportability when applying or acquiring a new technology: 
A technology benefit analysis looks for opportunities to apply state-
of-art capabilities for support. This analysis looks at new and 
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emerging technologies for application to the new system. 
Supportability engineering searches for how new technologies are 
being applied to other acquisition programs. It also looks to the 
future. There is a continual improvement and evaluation of 
technologies. These may be in areas of reliability, maintainability, 
testability, transportation, support equipment, computer-based 
training, innovative materials, alternative methods of production, 
different power sources, or anything else. (p. 6.14)   
No exact method has been developed to conduct a technology benefit 
analysis (Jones, 2006). In our thesis, we implemented the following methodology 
to find reliable and efficient results for a technology benefit analysis. 
First of all, we define the recent logistics problem areas of modern 
militaries. After defining logistics problem areas and needs in the literature review, 
we collected relevant data about the current and proposed applications of 
unmanned systems in civilian sector logistics. The Analysis chapter discussed the 
impact of using unmanned systems on the acquisition cost of products and their 
potential benefits and risks. In addition, we conduct research on the current and 
proposed applications of unmanned systems in military logistics. We classify 
these systems’ logistics usages according to their platforms such as UAVs, UGVs, 
and USVs/Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). By doing that, we examine 
existing and emerging unmanned technologies and evaluate the effects of these 
applications on the future of military logistics. Then, we analyze and process data 
and define positive and negative impacts of unmanned systems to military 
logistics in the Analysis chapter. In the Conclusion chapter, we recommend the 
most likely future uses of unmanned systems in military logistics.  
B. CASE STUDY METHOD 
According to Yin (2009), defining the research questions is probably the 
most important phase of the thesis. When research questions focus on “what” 
questions, Yin (2009) suggested this approach: If the “what” question has an 
exploratory character such as “What can be learned from a study of a startup 
business?” (p. 9), then any of the research methods—including “an exploratory 
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survey, an exploratory experiment, or an exploratory case study” (p. 9)—can be 
used (Yin, 2009). On the other hand, if the “what” question is more of a “how 
many, how much” type of question such as “What have been the ways that 
communities have assimilated new immigrants?” then a survey or archival 
analysis would be a more favorable approach (Yin, 2009). In contrast, questions 
having an exploratory character like “how and why” questions are more suitable 
for case studies, experiments, or histories.  
As explained previously, this thesis involves the following “what” question 
as the basis of its primary research: “What are the current and potential uses of 
unmanned systems for military logistics?” Considering Yin’s (2009) ideas, this 
question can be seen as having a “how much, how many” character at first 
glance. However, while evaluating the potential uses of unmanned systems 
specifically in the context of logistics, we used a step-by-step method to seek 
answers to the secondary research questions within the scope of the literature 
review.  
During the first step of this thesis, we sought to find relevant data within the 
scope of the following two secondary questions: “What are the current and 
proposed applications of unmanned systems in civilian sector logistics?” and 
“How would the use of unmanned vehicles impact the acquisition cost of products 
compared to other delivery methods?” Gathering relevant data to answer these 
questions required a detailed archival analysis and multiple case studies. The 
rationale for using multiple case studies together with archival analysis was to 
understand the investment decisions of specific commercial companies and 
military organizations.  
The data compiled to answer these two questions established a basis for 
the following secondary research question: “What are the advantages and risks of 
using unmanned systems in military logistics?” This thesis analyzes the systems 
that justify future investment. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
In the first section of this chapter, we suggest answers for the current and 
proposed applications of unmanned systems in military logistics. Then, in the 
second section, we evaluate unmanned systems’ impacts on the acquisition 
processes and cost evaluations. In the third and fourth sections respectively, we 
evaluate the potential benefits and risks of unmanned systems when used in 
military logistics.   
A. CURRENT AND PROPOSED APPLICATIONS OF UNMANNED 
SYSTEMS IN MILITARY LOGISTICS 
The Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (DOD, 2013) has played an 
important role in identifying trends about “vision and strategy for the continued 
development, production, test, training, operation, and sustainment of unmanned 
systems” (p. 5) between 2013 and 2038. It highlighted that, although the greatest 
technological improvements in unmanned systems have been on UAVs in the 
operational theater, the use of unmanned systems for of all kinds of military 
purposes has increased at an exponential rate for the last 10 years. The report 
listed the following as the primary areas in which unmanned systems have proven 
effective: reducing the heavy risk and workload for military personnel, improving 
situational awareness and task performances, and reducing costs related to 
military logistics operations. According to the roadmap, there are three kinds of 
missions that are preferred for unmanned systems: dangerous, dirty, and dull. The 
roadmap further explained that unmanned systems have the potential of fulfilling 
dangerous and dirty (chemical, nuclear, biological) tasks without putting military 
personnel in a risky position; in addition, dull tasks involving long-time surveillance 
can be a desirable choice for unmanned systems. 
According to existing literature, there are two primary uses for unmanned 
systems in current military logistics applications. One of them is making deliveries 
to combat units or military bases with unmanned systems. The other use for 
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unmanned systems (especially UAVs) for military logistics is ensuring security 
against threats that target military logistics assets like convoys, depots, and 
critical facilities. There are also other proposed applications that are still in the 
research and development phase. 
1. Warehouses and Other Logistic Capabilities 
Beyond security and unmanned delivery, Plinsky, Glass, and Yates (2012) 
mentioned another implication in their research. In accordance with the 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (DOD, 2013), the Army has been 
applying logistics operations like material handling, robotics base packaging, and 
warehousing with both manned workers and unmanned systems. Plinsky et al. 
(2012) also described other logistics operations that can be handled by unmanned 
systems, such as routine maintenance, munitions handling, and combat 
engineering. According to Plinsky et al. (2012), it is important to use unmanned 
systems in these kinds of applications, because they increase the level of safety 
and efficiency of the operations. Other studies have been going on under the 
umbrella of The Agile Robotics Project, which includes semi-autonomous 
commercial forklifts and autonomous material-handling capabilities (Plinsky et al., 
2012).   
2. Security Tasks for Logistic Convoys and Facilities  
In their research, Peters et al. (2011) focused on security-related 
applications for military logistics. Peters et al.’s (2011) research defined the 
difference between UAVs and UASs. UAVs are described as unmanned aircrafts, 
and UASs are described as aircrafts with a complete system, including ground 
stations for their operation, launch-recovery systems, and maintenance elements. 
In their research, Peters et al. (2011) defined 10 logistics applications and 
classified them according to their feasibility and cost-effectiveness. These logistics 
applications are convoy over-watch; river navigability; surveillance of critical 
assets like depots, pipelines, electrical lines, and important routes; support to 
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domestic disaster responses; pre-deployment theater reconnaissance; finding 
airdropped cargo; and retrograde of critical items (Peters et al., 2011).  
Peters et al. (2011) evaluated these 10 possible military logistics 
applications considering six factors. These factors are cost; terrain; enemy tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs); “values of damage or loss that could be 
avoided through reconnaissance and surveillance” (Peters et al., 2011, pp. 14–
15); weather; and bandwidth. In the cost factor, they discussed that as systems 
with the same abilities become cheaper, there is an economically favorable 
outcome for UAS uses. In the terrain factor, they discussed the specific 
characteristics of terrain. According to them, if the military operations take place in 
complex and preclusive terrains and if long distances prevent other uses, then 
UAVs are more attractive. As for the enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) factor, Peters et al. (2011) explained that when confronting an enemy who 
refuses to gather in groups and who makes use of hit-and-run tactics typical of 
terrorists, then it is not favorable to use UASs. Another factor they mentioned is 
that when using UASs can greatly decrease the risk of damage and loss, it is 
favorable to use UASs. The last two factors they highlighted were weather and 
bandwidth. It is favorable to use UASs in suitable “weather conditions that do not 
challenge flight parameters—such as high wind velocity, shear, and very cold 
temperatures—or sensor-operating parameters” (Peters et al., 2011, p. 15)—such 
as clouds, rain, and lightning. Regarding bandwidth, Peters et al. (2011) 
discussed another important term that is likely to affect future operational theaters, 
as well as the logistics needs of military units. According to Peters et al. (2011), 
If the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD (I)) 
Lieutenant General John Koziol’s 2024 vision of extremely high 
band width networked Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
eventuates and the Army can operate in Afghanistan and future 
theatres supported by a much richer, denser C4ISR network, then 
ownership of UAS for any specific tasks will be less critical because 
the network will quickly provide information from all of them in a 
theater. (p. 14)  
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In their research, Peters et al. (2011) focused on the surveillance and 
reconnaissance capabilities of UASs and their effects on the security and 
survivability of logistics convoys, which is an important aspect in the combat 
arena.  
Green (2011) focused on convoy security with UGVs (autonomous 
vehicles) in his research report. According to him, convoys with autonomous 
capability are necessary for the military because of the rapidly changing, unstable, 
and unexpected combat theater. In his study, Green (2011) also mentioned that in 
order to continue conducting operations in a dangerous and foggy environment, 
gaining an autonomous capability is crucial. He highlighted that although fully 
autonomous vehicles are possibly farther off into the future, an important step 
would be to have at least some part of a convoy composed of UGVs that follow a 
manned leader vehicle. It is particularly important to keep soldiers away from 
danger and keep conducting military actions without reducing the tempo. Green 
(2011) also asserted that an autonomous convoy capability might be an effective 
force multiplier and might increase the commander’s operational initiative and 
flexibility. In addition, an autonomous convoy might advance in the field at a 
higher speed and with a closer formation, ensuring rapid movement of the convoy 
(Green, 2011). For a manned convoy, moving closer together increases the risk of 
casualty from an improvised explosive device (IED) attack. But for the unmanned 
convoy, that might be an affordable risk when a commander considers speed over 
security concerns.  
Although it is not specific to logistic facilities, Blain (2010) provided 
information about a South Korean military manufacturer DoDAMM and its product, 
an autonomous robot gun turret, Super aEgis 2 (see Figure 3). It was specifically 
invented for protecting the border, demilitarized zone (DMZ), between North and 
South Korea (Blain, 2010). According to Blain (2010), 
The Super aEgis 2 is an automated gun tower that can find and lock 
on to a human-sized target in pitch darkness at a distance of up to 
1.36 miles (2.2 kilometers). It uses a 35x zoom charge coupled 
device (CCD) camera with “enhancement feature” for bad weather, 
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in conjunction with a dual field of view (FOV), autofocus Infra-Red 
sensor, to pick out targets (para. 6). 
We included this autonomous weapon in our research because of its 
potential for use in military logistic facilities. 
 
Figure 3.  DoDAMM's Super aEgis 2: South Korea’s Autonomous Robot 
Gun Turret. Source: Blain (2010). 
According to Shachtman (2008), the U.S. Army also tested robotic patrol 
sentries called “Mobile Detection and Assessment and Response System 
(MDARS)” (para.1) from 2004 to 2008 at Hawthorne Army Depot in Nevada (see 
Figure 4). Then in 2008, the U.S. Army decided to order 24 more MDARS for $40 
million.  
In his article, Shachtman (2008) also pointed out that  
the diesel-powered robots, in development since 1989, operate “at 
speeds up to 20 miles per hour and can run for 16 hours without 
refueling," according to its manufacturer, General Dynamics. “Using 
radio frequency identification tags, MDARS keeps track of inventory, 
as well as gates, locks and other barriers.” (para. 2) 
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Figure 4.  Robot Sentries for Base Patrol. Source: Shachtman (2008). 
3. Unmanned Systems Delivery 
Joint Vision 2020, a report that guides the continuous transformation of the 
U.S. Armed Forces, explained the concept of focused logistics (National Defense 
University, 2000). According to Joint Vision 2020, 
Focused logistics will provide military capability by ensuring delivery 
of the right equipment, supplies, and personnel in the right 
quantities, to the right place, at the right time to support operational 
objectives. It will result from revolutionary improvements in 
information systems, innovation in organizational structures, 
reengineered processes, and advances in transportation 
technologies. This transformation has already begun with changes 
scheduled for the near term facilitating the ultimate realization of the 
full potential of focused logistics. (p. 69) 
Joint Vision 2020 pointed out the importance of advances in transportation 
regarding military logistics and also made the case that following the best private 
practices is an important factor for military leaders.   
Chestnut (2012) also focused on the importance of the distribution 
capability of the military. Use of unmanned systems has decreased the risks to 
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human life and also decreased the potential costs of military. Chestnut (2012) 
studied UAVs, UGVs, and USVs and their use in the delivery of logistics supplies.  
a. Unmanned Aerial Systems for Logistics and K-MAX Cargo 
Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Case 
Although not a common way of delivering goods, UAVs have been the 
focus of both studies and applications for logistics delivery. Plinsky et al. (2012) 
explained that using UAVs for logistics delivery would be a viable alternative to 
the classic means of logistic distribution. They also mention that 
LIA has been actively involved in assessing the requirement for a 
cargo unmanned aircraft system (Cargo UAS). The U.S. Army 
Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) and the Army G-4 
study, The Future Modular Force Resupply Mission for Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems, assessed the technical and operational feasibility 
of a Cargo UAS. (Plinsky et al., 2012, p. 42) 
McCoy (2002) discussed UAVs in his study regarding their uses for 
logistics operations, comparing them with other means of logistics deliveries. He 
also concluded that using UAVs in operational theaters would decrease the risk of 
human life and logistic footprints significantly.    
In her study, Chestnut (2012) went back to 1783 and reported historical 
facts about aerial balloons that shed light onto the invention of unmanned aerial 
technology. She supposed that uses of unmanned aerial systems would make it 
faster to deliver critical goods like ammunition, food, medical supplies, and so 
forth. She also mentioned that not many applications currently use unmanned 
systems for logistics. According to Chestnut (2012), the U.S. military has a 
growing interest in using unmanned systems in military logistics; for example, the 
Marine Corps has been testing an unmanned helicopter that can carry 6,000 
pounds of supplies in Afghanistan. She also highlighted that in 2012, the Army 
published a request for information (RFI) for unmanned aerial systems that could 
serve as a cargo vehicle. The U.S. Army is focusing on Cargo UAS-related 
concepts for the next eight to 10 years, and among these concepts, the ability to 
carry between 5,000 and 8,000 pounds of supplies was a remarkable one. 
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(1) K-MAX Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) 
The unmanned helicopter Chestnut (2012) mentioned was K-MAX. K-MAX 
is a partnership of Martin Corporation and Kaman Aerospace Corporation 
(Lockheed Martin, 2016). It can be used as both the autonomous and remote-
controlled models (see Figure 5).  
 
K-MAX features Kaman’s proven high-altitude, heavy-lift K-1200 airframe and 
Lockheed Martin’s mission management and control systems, enabling 
autonomous flight in remote environments over large distances. 
Figure 5.  Unmanned Cargo Resupply. Source: Lockheed Martin (2016). 
In his study, Haddick (2016) explained that the U.S. Marine Corps started 
using unmanned systems for delivery in military special operations concept (see 
Figure 6). 
Beginning in 2011, the U.S. Marine Corps started using the K-MAX 
unmanned autonomous cargo helicopter to deliver supplies and 
equipment to distributed combat outposts in Afghanistan. K-MAX 
can carry 6,000 pounds of cargo at sea level and 4,000 at 15,000 
feet density altitude. 37 K-MAX unmanned helicopters flew 1,730 
resupply sorties for the Marine Corps in Afghanistan, delivering four 
million pounds of cargo. (Haddick, 2016, p. 21) 
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Troops are familiarizing themselves with the downward thrust of a K-MAX 
unmanned aerial vehicle during initial testing in Helmand province, Afghanistan. 
U.S. Marine Corps photo by Corporal Lisa Tourtelot. 
Figure 6.  U.S. Marines with Combat Logistics Battalion 5 Return from K-
MAX. Source: Haddick (2016). 
According to Haddick (2016), the military official should continue 
developing unmanned systems like K-MAX that can carry supplies in 
unconventional warfare operations (UWO). On the other hand, autonomous cargo 
helicopters have still problems like reliability, affordability, and stealth problems for 
use in UWO concept (Haddick, 2016).  
K-MAX was also used in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) by the U.S. Marine Corps (Peterson & Staley, 2011). It has a capability of 
carrying 3,000 pounds of supply one at a time and four times 750 pounds of 
supply in multiple drop operations (E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 
12, 2011) as cited in (Peterson & Staley, 2011). The payload capacity of K-MAX 
also depends on the altitude at which it operates (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7.  K-MAX Payload Capacity. Source: Lockheed Martin (2010), as 
cited in Denevan (2014).    
(2) A160T Hummingbird CUAS 
A160T Hummingbird CUAS had a small ground station, which is less than 
20 pounds, and it could drop deliveries with a precision of less than three meters 
(E. N. Pratson, personal communication, June 12, 2011) as cited in Peterson and 
Staley (2011).  
As shown in Figure 8,  
both K-MAX and A160T have successfully demonstrated the ability 
to accomplish the following: deliver 2,500 pounds of cargo in a six-
hour period to a location 75 nautical miles away, hover with 750-
pound loads at 12,000 feet, operate beyond line of sight with GPS 
en route navigation, deliver cargo with the accuracy of 10 meters 
with terminal controller, terminal control capability to shift location 
1,000 meters, and maintain a cruise flight of 15,000 feet. (Peterson 




Figure 8.  UAS Demonstrated Capabilities. Source: E. N. Pratson, personal 
communication, June 12, 2011, as cited in Peterson & Staley, 
(2011). 
(3) Delivery with Micro Aerial Vehicles 
Another method for delivering supplies is the micro aerial vehicles. Haddick 
(2016) mentioned that with their small size, micro UAVs can carry supplies in a 
clandestine environment successfully. According to him, new recreational micro 
UAVs can be quickly improved and used with a GPS-enabled auto-pilot system 
with a small cost. Micro UAVs could be vulnerable to small arms, but this can be 
prevented with night operations (Haddick, 2016). Haddick (2016) explained their 
uses: 
The micro-UAV concept could be employed on a small scale to 
deliver high-value items such as medical supplies, vaccines, cash, 
and water purification equipment. On a larger scale, the concept 
could deliver routine supply classes to combat outposts, patrols, and 
remote guerrilla and SOF operator sites. Although preparing 200 
micro UAVs for a night mission would be a tedious task and would 
risk creating an unfavorable signature in the host country, spreading 
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the load among that many delivery vehicles would mitigate the risks 
when delivery aircraft are lost to malfunction or enemy action. (p. 28) 
Although recent micro UAVs can hardly fulfill military cargo delivery, 
improvements in UAV components like batteries, motors, and electronics will 
prove successful in using these systems for cargo delivery missions in access-
denied areas.  
b. Unmanned Ground Systems for Logistics 
Chestnut (2012) gathered valuable information about the unmanned 
ground systems that organizations like the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) and the Marine Corps are exploring. 
 According to Chestnut (2012), the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory has started testing Unmanned Medium Tactical Vehicle 
Replacement (MTVR) Truck to prevent Marines’ exposure to danger 
for resupply convoys.   
 Another unmanned system that the Marine Corps has started testing 
is the Ground Unmanned Vehicle Support Surrogate. Their plan is to 
use this vehicle for carrying supply items for dismounted personnel 
(Chestnut, 2012). 
 DARPA has been doing research on a four-legged Squad Support 
System (LS3). LS3 has the mobility to stand, lie, and move with the 
soldiers, and it can walk 20 miles in 24 hours without refueling. 
There are also other types of unmanned systems with different 
characteristics, like R-Gator, Carry-all Mechanized Equipment 
Landrover (CaMEL), and Porter. The U.S. military has been 
conducting research and development on them (Chestnut, 2012). 
According to Marshall (2016), U.S. Army started testing four semi-
autonomous trucks in real Michigan traffic. He stated that trucks also had their 
drivers inside for monitoring the drive. These beta-trucks were using Light 
Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) system with cameras and short-range radios 
(Marshall, 2016). According to Army engineers, “fully autonomous convoys would 
be ready to serve in conflict zones in 10 to 15 years” (Marshall, 2016, para. 5). It 
is obvious that this technology would significantly decrease the potential for 
casualties from IED threats for ground logistics convoys (Marshall, 2016).   
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c. Unmanned Maritime Systems for Logistics 
Although UUVs and USVs are mainly intended to be used for 
reconnaissance, surveillance, warfare, and other missions, the Navy’s Master 
Plan defined some important tasks for them regarding logistics support of units 
(Chestnut, 2012). In her study, Chestnut (2012) stated that U.S. Navy’s 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master Plan defined USVs’ role as providing logistical 
support to Special Operations Forces (SOF). 
Haddick (2016) explained that SOF logisticians should use small UUVs to 
deliver supplies to friendly forces (see Figure 9). He also mentions that these 
vehicles can begin operating in international waters, and they can go to the 
operational area by themselves. After leaving the necessary supplies to friendly 
forces, they can go back to their starting point.  
 
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV), Keyport Undersea Warfare Center, and 
Penn State University lower SUBDEVRON 5 Det. UUV’s first UUV LTV-38 into the 
water to conduct its first in-water training. Source: U.S. Navy photo by Breanna 
Zinter. 
Figure 9.  Members of Submarine Development Squadron Detachment 5 
(SUBDEVRON Det.) Source: Haddick (2016), p. 29. 
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A. IMPACTS OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS TO THE ACQUISITION COSTS 
OF PRODUCTS COMPARED TO OTHER DELIVERY METHODS 
Logistics delivery with all kinds of unmanned systems is on the verge of 
significant improvements. However, we decided to consider only unmanned aerial 
delivery methods to evaluate the potential impacts on the acquisition costs of 
products compared to other delivery methods. In our decision, we took the 
growing potential of aerial delivery applications in civilian-sector logistics including 
Amazon, Ali Baba, and DHL and the existing research on military aerial delivery 
applications in previous operations like OEF into account.  
1. Previous Studies on the Cost Evaluations of Unmanned Aerial 
Delivery Methods 
During our research, we found two significant studies that helped us to 
define cost drivers and cost differences between Cargo UAVs and standard cargo 
delivery methods.  
a. Economical Evaluation of Cargo UAVs in Support of Forward 
Deployed Logistics in OEF 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, Cargo UAVs have already been tested 
by the U.S. Marine Corps during OEF. Peterson and Staley (2011) conducted a 
business case analysis (BCA) in their MBA professional report: Business Case 
Analysis of Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Capability in Support of 
Forward Deployed Logistics in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In their study, 
they aimed to find out the potential cost savings when Cargo UAVs (K-MAX and 
A160T) are used in the OEF. Within the scope of their research, they compared 
procuring, operating, and sustaining costs of Lockheed Martin K-MAX or Boeing 
A160T Hummingbird Cargo UAVs with standard cargo delivery methods. When 
comparing Cargo UAVs’ capabilities with the traditional ground and air logistics 
delivery methods, they mainly focused on the IED threats for ground convoys and 
the potential delays in supply chains caused by harsh weather conditions, fuel 
replenishment, maintenance necessities, and flight crew rest as the basis of their 
research on the BCA of Cargo UAVs’ capabilities.  
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In their study, Peterson and Staley (2011) conducted an analysis 
comparing Cargo UAVs, “Boeing’s A160T Hummingbird and Lockheed Martin’s K-
MAX” (p. 29), with four standard methods of logistics delivery methods, “medium-
security ground convoy, high-security ground convoy, CH-53E, and KC-130J with 
joint precision airdrop systems (JPADS)” (p. 29). They used five different 
scenarios while comparing costs by using linear programming. In these five 
scenarios, Peterson and Staley (2011) simulated “an infantry battalion operating 
in Afghanistan with five forward operating bases (FOBs)” (p. 31). They assumed 
both Cargo UAVs and traditional methods may be started from mobile operating 
base (MOB) Camp Bastion. Peterson and Staley (2011) used the distance (in 
miles) from MOB to each FOBs for the cost evaluations.  
Within the scope of their analysis, they defined these four known cost 
drivers: 
(1) Platform Procurement/Replacement Costs 
These costs stem from the attrition rate for replacing assets destroyed by 







Table 1.   Summary of Replacement Costs. Source: Peterson & Staley 
(2011). 
 
(2) Platform Operating and Support Costs 
Peterson and Staley (2011) used “dollars per mile for ground convoys and 
dollars per flight hour for air platforms” (p. 36). Peterson and Staley (2011) 
calculated the “platform operating and support costs” (p. 36) with these formulas: 
 The calculations for ground convoy costs include fuel/mile + 
manpower/mile + maintenance/mile + personnel risk exposure/mile 
+ platform risk exposure/mile.  
 The calculations for CH-53E are fuel/hour + manpower/hour + 
maintenance/hour + personnel risk exposure/hour + platform risk 
exposure/hour.  
 The calculations for KC-130J are fuel/hour + manpower/hour + 
maintenance/hour + personnel risk exposure/hour + platform (KC-
130J) risk exposure/hour + platform (JPADS) risk exposure/hour. 
The calculations for JPADS costs include 0.05 × $12,000 
(replacement costs). This cost is based on the assumption that 95% 
of the JPADS will be recovered by global positioning system (GPS) 
and associated sensitive equipment for each evolution, whereas the 
canopy will not always be recovered in a reusable manner.  
 The calculations for both variants of CUAS costs included fuel/hour 
+ maintenance/hour + GCS manpower/hour + risk exposure 












(3) Personnel Risk Exposure 
In their study, Peterson and Staley (2011) defined the cost of life for one 
Marine soldier as $6 million. Then, they found out the loss rate of ground 
personnel from 2008 joint IED defense office (General Dynamics, 2010) as cited 
in (Peterson & Staley, 2011).  
Peterson and Staley (2011) calculated the personnel risk exposure costs 
with the following formulas:  
 Ground convoys are attacked every 808 miles and there would be 
one killed in action (KIA) out of every 16 attacks; 
 Assumption of a one-year deployment resulting in 122 ground 
convoys (365/3=122); 
 122 convoys multiplied by the total miles traveled for one complete 
replenishment of all five FOBs equaled 575.2 miles; 
 122 convoys * 575.2 miles resulted in 70,175 total miles per year; 
 The total miles per year divided by miles per attack resulted in 87 
attacks (70175/808 = 87 attacks); 
 The 87 total attacks per year divided by every 16 attacks resulted in 
one KIA per 5.43 attacks (87/16 = 5.43); 
 Total miles traveled divided by attacks resulted in a KIA rate of 
0.0000774 (5.43/70,175 = 0.0000774); and 
 The attack rate multiplied by the $6,000,000 cost of human life, 
resulted in a $1,393.20 per mile per truck cost (Peterson & Staley, 
2011, p. 38). 

















(4) Platform Risk Exposure 
To find platform risk exposure, Peterson and Staley (2011) defined losses 
that stemmed from each method of resupply. Then, they multiplied rate of losing 
resupply because of enemy or mishap with replacement costs of platforms.  
For this calculation, “the loss rate of ground personnel was determined by 
using the 2008 joint IED defense office JIEDDO as stated in the General 
Dynamics AR-5 study, 2010” (Peterson & Staley, 2011, p. 41).   
Peterson and Staley (2011) also used General Dynamics’s 2010 study 
when calculating the following costs: 
 On average, ground convoys are attacked every 808 miles; 
 There would be one ground convoy prevented from completing its 
resupply mission for every 11 attacks; 
 With the assumption of a one-year deployment resulting in 122 
ground convoys (365/3 = 122) multiplied by the total miles traveled 
for one total replenishment of all five FOBs equaling 575.2 miles 
resulting in 70,175 total miles per year; 
 The total miles per year divided by miles per attack (70175/808 = 87 
attacks) resulted in 87 attacks; 
 Of the 87 total attacks per year divided by every 11 attacks resulting 
in one resupply mission being prevented (87/11 = 7.91) resulted in a 
rate of 7.91 attacks; 
 The rate of attacks resulting in resupply mission being prevented 
was then divided by total miles (7.91/70,175 = 0.000113) resulting in 
a rate of 0.000113; 
 This attack rate is then multiplied by the procurement cost of ground 
vehicles and provides a per mile cost for each ground platform; 
 Loss rates for manned fixed and rotary wing aircraft were taken from 
the Naval Safety Center and are the same calculation as previously 
stated for the risk exposure of personnel; and  
 Unmanned loss rates were taken from the average loss rates of the 
MQ-9 Reaper (Air Force safety center, 2008). They were calculated 
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by dividing the total Class A Mishaps by the total flight hours 
(Peterson & Staley, 2011, p. 41). (See Table 4). 
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Table 4. Summary of Platform Risk Exposure Costs. Source: Peterson & Staley (2011). 
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According to the findings of this study, if human life is considered to have a 
value below $2 million, then it would be more economical to use ground convoy 
than to use K-MAX in logistics delivery. However, most U.S. government 
agencies, including the “Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation 
Administration” (Silney, Little, & Remer, 2010) as cited in (Peterson & Staley, 
2011, p. 38), value human life higher than $2 million, depending on several factors 
including “life insurance, survivor benefits, loss of earnings, lost human capital, 
and welfare lost to society” (Peterson & Staley, 2011, p. 38). In addition, using 
ground convoys would increase the risk of losing more soldier lives (Peterson & 
Staley, 2011). The study also found that “when the human life valued $0, then 
three ground convoys, seven CH-53E sorties, four KC-130J sorties and four K-
MAX sorties are used” (Peterson & Staley, 2011, p. 55). Based on the study, K-
MAX is an efficient alternative way of replenishment in comparison with the 
traditional methods. According to the research, K-MAX can be used especially in 
class-I deliveries by decreasing transportation costs and eliminating all ground 
convoys.  
On the other hand, A160T Hummingbirds have “potential to provide 
responsive and time-sensitive support for special operations” (Peterson & Staley, 
2011, p. 59). In addition, because of their less payload capacity than K-MAX 
models, they significantly increase transportation costs (Peterson & Staley, 2011). 
b. Cost-Based Analysis of UAVs in the Logistical Support Role 
In his thesis: Cost-Based Analysis of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/ 
Unmanned Aerial Systems in Filling the Role of Logistical Support, Denevan 
(2014) conducted a cost-based analysis with different models of UAVs and 
traditional aircrafts with a larger scope than Peterson and Staley’s (2011) study. 
Denevan (2014) defined various kinds of UAVs and traditional logistical resupply 
resources that were being used in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). He 
used KC-130J, MV-22, and CH-53E as the traditional resupply resources and 
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MQ-4C Triton, MQ-8B Fire Scout, MQ-8C Fire Scout, MQ-9 Reaper, K-MAX, and 
RQ-4 Global Hawk as UAV models for his cost-based comparison.  
Table 5 shows capabilities of different aircrafts that Denevan (2014) used 
in his study. 
Table 5.   Nomenclature of Aircraft Used in This Study. 
Source: Denevan (2014). 
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To calculate relevant costs of aircrafts, Denevan (2014) used “flight 
operations budget, known as Operational Plan 20 (OP-20)” (p. 35), and personnel 
risk exposure costs. He ignored life-cycle costs, because many of the aircrafts 
that he used were emerging technologies.  
Denevan (2014) explained his cost drivers as follows: 
(1)  The Flight Operations Budget (The OP-20 and the Flight Hour 
Program) 
In his study, Denevan (2014) explained the OP-20 as a planning document 
that had several particular funding options. When it comes to “the Operation and 
Support (O&S) level of acquisition” (Denevan, 2014, p. 35), he considered Glenn 
and Otten’s (1995) MBA Professional Report, Commander Naval Air Forces 
(CNAF) Flight Hour Program: Budgeting and Execution Response to the 
Implementation of the Fleet Response Plan and OP-20 Pricing Model Changes. In 
their report, Glenn and Otten (1995) broke O&S funding into two sections, “Aircraft 
Flight Operations (AFO) and Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM)” (Denevan, 
2014, p. 35).  
 Aircraft Flight Operation Costs: AFO funding consists of two codes: 
7B (fuel, petroleum, oil, lubricants) and 7F (flight equipment such as 
flight suits, boots, and other equipment.) (Glenn & Otten, 1995) as 
cited in (Denevan, 2014). 
 Aircraft Operations Maintenance Costs: AOM funding consists of 9S 
(repairable material), 7L (consumable material), FW (contract costs), 
and F0 (other costs) (Glenn & Otten, 1995) as cited in (Denevan, 
2014).  
(2) Personnel Risk Exposure Costs 
In his study, Denevan (2014) used the same rate and value of $6 million for 
the loss of a life as in Peterson and Staley’s (2011) study and adjusted the cost to 
the FY14$ value.  
Considering these two cost drivers (the flight operations budget and 
personnel risk exposure costs), Denevan (2014) calculated “Costs per flight hour 
= total procurement costs of each aircraft divided by projected hours to be flown” 
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(p. 42). Table 6 provides information on Denevan’s (2014) calculation of costs per 
flight hour for each aircraft vehicle.  
Table 6.   Cost per Flight Hour for Each Vehicle Used in This Study. 
Source: Denevan (2014). 
 
 
After finding costs per flight hour, Denevan (2014) conducted cost-based 
analysis for the following known distances: 25, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1,000, 2,500, 
5,000, 10,000, and 15,000 miles. In our study, we provide Denevan’s (2014) 25 
and 15,000 miles of cost-based analysis to understand the effects of cost drivers 
better. Table 7 and Table 8 provide Denevan’s (2014) cost-based analysis for 25 




Table 7.   Cost-Based Analysis for Known Distance of 25 Miles. 
Source: Denevan (2014). 
 
Table 8.   Cost-Based Analysis for Known Distance of 15,000 Miles. 
Source: Denevan (2014). 
 
 
Denevan (2014) shared his findings based on his cost-based analysis. 
According to him, with its high payload capacity compared to other UAVs, K-
MAXs would lower costs, provided that their speed would be increased by their 
manufacturers. K-MAX provided significant cost savings when compared to the 
MV-22 and the CH-53E types of traditional aircrafts (Denevan, 2014). Among the 
traditional aircrafts, KC-130J was the cheapest and the most ideal one for large 
payloads.   
2. Unmanned Systems’ Effects on Acquisition Processes 
Military technologies have always been important for countries. Countries 
have to equip their armies with necessary technologies. Weapons and vehicles 
are among the most important military assets necessitating technological 
advance. There are different kinds of sensors, radars, communication devices, 
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armor technologies, and computer software embedded in these military assets’ 
more recent versions. With their complex technology, unmanned systems also 
have most of these advanced technologies inside. After their introduction to the 
warfare theater, they have changed the game significantly with their superior 
capabilities.  
In addition to cost efficiencies mentioned earlier, unmanned systems have 
significant effects on the acquisition system and its processes. Thirtle, Johnson, 
and Birkler (1997) mentioned some of these effects in their RAND report, The 
Predator Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD): A Case Study 
for Transition Planning to the Formal Acquisition Process. According to them, the 
ACTD concept was introduced in 1993, because the senior DOD officials were 
sharing the same opinion that traditional acquisition processes had not been 
efficient enough in meeting warfighters’ technological demands. Thirtle et al. 
(1997) explained ACTD:  
An ACTD is a joint exercise: It is developed and implemented by 
both the operational user and the materiel development 
communities. Acceptance or rejection of an ACTD is based on the 
warfighter’s evaluation of the military utility of the system as well as 
on other factors, such as affordability and supportability. (p. 14) 
So “given these criteria, not all ACTDs are expected to be successful or to 
make the transition to the formal acquisition process” (Thirtle et al., 1997, p. 14). 
After the ACTD process started, an existing project, “the Medium Altitude 
Endurance (MAE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), or Predator, a new system 
within the old UAV family was selected” (Thirtle et al., 1997, p. 14) to be a model 
for this new process. According to Thirtle et al. (1997), the main goal for the ACTD 
process was the successful implementation of ACTD or transitioning of it to the 
usual acquisition process, and the Predator was among the first projects that 
achieved this. Specifically in ACTD process,  
operational users not only participate in the management and 
execution of program decisions, they also provide the final decision 
on whether an ACTD should be transitioned to the formal acquisition 
process. If warfighters believe that ACTD has military value, then 
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“military utility” is declared and the ACTD is transitioned, provided 
that ample funding exists. (Thirtle et al., 1997, p. 15) 
Jones (2014) also pointed out the effects of various unmanned system 
projects on acquisition processes in his thesis report, An Analysis of the Defense 
Acquisition Strategy for Unmanned Systems. He addressed unmanned systems 
as revolutionary assets for war with their effects on warfare like decreasing time 
and increasing capabilities for military operations, and also protecting human 
lives. In addition to these effects, he also mentioned that unmanned systems have 
necessitated “new contractual arrangements that focus more on outcomes, not 
parts and services” (Jones, 2014, p. 51). Jones (2014) explained the Joint 
Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process:  
The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) 
process was implemented in 2003 to assist the Joint Requirements 
and Oversight Council (JROC) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (CJCS) in “identifying, assessing, validating, and prioritizing 
joint military capability requirements” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff [CJCS], 2012, p. 1). (Jones, 2014, p. 52) 
According to Jones (2014), the JCIDS process gives the combatant 
commander the opportunity of detecting capability gaps of their units in 
comparison with enemies. However, he also emphasized that the JCIDS process 
is cumbersome and time consuming. In addition, “JCIDS process has been the 
lack of synchronization with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution (PPBE) system designed to fund service programs” (Jones, 2014, p. 
52). JCIDS cannot prioritize its programs the same as individual services do 
(Jones, 2014). 
Jones (2014) pointed out another discussion point for JCIDS system. “The 
JCIDS process identifies the ‘lead users’ as the regional and functional combatant 
commanders” (Jones, 2014, p. 52). Jones (2014) emphasized that main reason 
for this is to gain enough feedback about the product in the early phases of its 
development to shape it according to its targeted capabilities. He also added that 
the JCIDS process is problematic because of its length. Combatant commanders 
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and operational necessities frequently change during the long JCIDS process 
(Jones, 2014). This, obviously, causes a significant drop in reliability of the 
acquisition process. Another issue with JCIDS process is that most of the 
combatant commanders are not the end users of the products that are in the 
acquisition process (Jones, 2014). 
On the other hand, unmanned systems have positively affected the slow-
moving JCIDS process (Jones, 2014). With the successfully articulated demands 
coming from the front lines, better feedback has started to be sent from these lead 
users, and better responses have started to be given from more capable and 
dynamic unmanned systems industry (Jones, 2014). Jones (2014) also explained 
the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) program. According to Jones (2014), 
“the JUON process has a staffing goal of 15 days after the JUON submission, with 
a complete development and fielding time frame of not more than 24 months 
(CJCS, 2012)” (p. 53). He also provided a remarkable example of the JUON 
program, the procurement of K-MAX Cargo Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS). In 
his article, Putrich (2010) explained that the U.S. Marine Corps provided a 
$75 million contract award for this procurement between Lockheed Martin (with 
Kaman) and Boeing for development of two different CUASs, K-MAX and A160T 
respectively. As a result, the U.S. Marine Corps chose and procured two K-MAX 
CUASs and started using them for cargo delivery in Afghanistan (Hoffman, 2013). 
Jones (2014) pointed out this procurement in such a short time as unprecedented. 
In addition, the abovementioned private companies proved this remarkable 
success thanks to their continuous research and development (R&D) and 
marketing efforts (Jones, 2014).  
Another effect of unmanned systems to the acquisition process is related to 
the use of performance-based logistics (Jones, 2014). According to Jones (2014), 
within the concept of performance-based logistics, the DOD does not pay for 
“individual transactions for things like spare parts, repairs, or hours of technical 
support” (Vitasek, Geary, & Quick, 2006, p. 1). However, it pays for “weapons 
system performance over the entire life cycle of the systems,” (Vitasek et al., 
 59 
2006, p. 1). Jones (2014) also added that “by shifting performance responsibility 
to the contractor, the DOD can reduce total ownership cost and benefit from 
contractor measures to improve efficiencies” (p. 54). Owings (2010) also provided 
an example from RQ-7B Shadow Tactical UASs’ acquisition process. According to 
Owings (2010), the DOD required specific metrics for contractors and let them 
decide how to fulfill them. With the fulfillment of these contracted metrics, 
innovational design of assets are also possible to be implemented (Jones, 2014). 
Jones (2014) also mentioned that 
Tadjdeh (2013) pointed to the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) 
as a model for shortening the lead user feedback loop. The REF 
was responsible for the procurement of AeroVironment’s Puma 
UAV, which has now become a program of record. The REF 
communicates directly between the lead user and AeroVironment for 
upgrades demand by the warfighter. (p. 54) 
On the other hand, there have also been negative examples of unmanned 
systems’ acquisition processes like in the Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence 
Vehicle (LEMV) case (Jones, 2014). Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman 
were the only two competing contractors (Jones, 2014). However, Lockheed 
Martin opted out from the acquisition process because of the 18-months 
development schedule (Jones, 2014). With Northrop Grumman as the only 
contractor, Army Intelligence officials tried seeking funds directly from Congress 
skipping the usual acquisition process (Axe, 2013). Jones (2014) pointed out the 
results as not desirable. The LEMV project saw cost and schedule overruns, as 
well as developmental inefficiencies regarding its weight (Jones, 2014). In 
addition, the LEMV project met with budget cuts, and it was eventually canceled 
(Jones, 2014). 
B. POSITIVE IMPACTS OF USING UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN MILITARY 
LOGISTICS 
In this part of our “Analysis” chapter, we evaluate the current and proposed 
applications in both military and civilian sectors, and defined positive impacts of 
unmanned systems in military logistics. In the “Background and Literature Review” 
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chapter of our thesis, we studied military logistics and defined military logistics 
challenges. These challenges were grouped under two main problematic areas, 
as in Kang’s (2016) lecture notes: uncertainty and security issues. In this part, we 
initially grouped positive impacts of unmanned systems under the two mentioned 
problematic areas. After defining possible solutions for these two problems, we 
focused on other positive impacts.  
1. Impacts of Unmanned Systems to Uncertainty Issue 
Ivanov and Sokolov (2010) defined uncertainty as drifting from the 
expected results in either positive or negative ways. Li and Schulze (2011) 
provided valuable information about uncertainty that can be applied to military 
logistics in their research paper, Uncertainty in Logistics Network Design: A 
Review. According to them, uncertainty is among the biggest problems in a supply 
chain because it is possible to encounter this issue in all levels of a supply chain. 
They explained this process in three steps: At the beginning of supply chain, a 
supplier can be late, at the middle of a supply chain a normal working procedure 
can stop working, and at the end customer demand always changes. Li and 
Schulze (2011) also pointed out the performance measures of logistics network 
model. According to them, quantitative performance measures are mainly related 
to costs, profits, and customer-related metrics. On the other hand, there are 
qualitative performance measures: customer satisfaction, flexibility, visibility, and 
trust. If we apply this explanation of Li and Schulze (2011) to the military supply 
chain, we can find out the same results with different terminology.  
In the strategic level of logistics, logistic necessities of combat units should 
be forecasted before military operations. According to the results of these 
forecasts, military logistics officials decide necessary amounts of logistic assets 
like personnel, weapons, vehicles, equipment, fuel, food, and ammunition. In 
addition to the materiel needs, service needs such as medical treatment and 
evacuation are also planned by military officials. Considering these items and 
services, military officials decide necessary R&D planning or acquisition 
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processes in peace time. At this level, production and acquisition processes are 
mainly impacted by the time and cost uncertainties. For some logistic assets, 
militaries might consider using their own capabilities and facilities. On the other 
hand, for logistic assets that require higher technology, officials might consider 
strategic purchasing. Then contracts are made with suppliers. Acquisition 
processes begin.  
As we discussed in previous chapters, civilian firms with high profit margins 
have started investing in automation systems. Militaries also can overcome 
uncertainty issues at the beginning and middle of their supply chain regarding 
suppliers and production by investing more in automation systems in military 
warehouses and production facilities. These automation capabilities in 
factories/warehouses can have the same cost-efficiency and time-savings effects 
on Li and Schulze’s (2011) quantitative performance measures as they do in 
civilian sector logistics. In addition, increasing automation in military 
warehouses/factories can also help decreasing working personnel in these 
facilities. These personnel can be assigned to other value-added missions. This 
can be explained as the flexibility effect on Li and Schulze’s (2011) qualitative 
performance measures.  
Peltz, Halliday, Robbins, and Girardini (2005) also discussed the issue of 
uncertainty in their RAND report, Sustainment of Army in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. They pointed out that having quality information in all logistics 
processes would have significant effects on the operational decision-making 
process. According to them, poor logistics information and visibility would have an 
incremental effect on uncertainty. In addition, while every single item count is 
crucial on the tactical level, information about readiness on the operational and 
strategic levels must rely on information that was obtained in the tactical level and 
that is available in an automated system (Peltz et al., 2005). The authors added 
that “the more automated that detailed supply accounting becomes, the more 
current high-level logistics situational awareness will be” (p. 70). The visibility 
issue might also affect inventory levels and safety stock calculations accordingly. 
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With the help of unmanned industrial systems, inventory levels might significantly 
drop. Jesion (2002) also mentioned that autonomous systems might have a direct 
effect on decreasing unit/personnel sizes and their sustainability levels. He also 
added that “embedded sensors have the capability to radically improve 
ammunition and spares management in the same way that commercial ‘checkout 
counters’ automatically re-order stock for items that are being purchased or drawn 
on” (p. 10). 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, unmanned systems like K-MAX, 
A160T Hummingbird types of Cargo UAS, proposed Cargo UGVs, and USVs can 
also significantly decrease lead-time and uncertainty accordingly by interfering 
less risk and carrying on missions in less time. For medical emergencies and 
urgent ammunition requirements in small sizes, small UAVs can be used as an 
alternative delivery method especially when units are under fire like recent 
commercial applications, which are mentioned in our literature review chapter. 
2. Impacts of Unmanned Systems to Security Issue 
Another important aspect of military logistic operations is the security issue. 
Security is the part that mainly diversifies military logistic applications from the 
commercial ones. Although civilian logistics has concerns about the security of 
their facilities like warehouses and factories, in military logistics the spectrum is 
dramatically broader.  
We mentioned Blain’s (2010) and Shachtman’s (2008) articles earlier in 
this chapter that autonomous sentries have already been tested and used by 
different country’s militaries including United States and South Korea. These 
autonomous weapons applications are important examples of where sentry 
technology can be used. According to Singer (2009), “unmanned sentries can 
guard entrances, automatically patrol perimeters, check IDs, and even use facial 
recognition software to know who should or shouldn’t be allowed into the area” (p. 
39). In addition, Cares and Dickmann (2016) emphasized unmanned sentry 
technology in their book, Operations Research for Unmanned Systems. According 
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to them, unmanned sentries can be a cheaper option than using humans when 
considering military base security tasks. With their superior surveillance and 
sensor capabilities, detection of intruders can be easier for autonomous sentries. 
Logistics facilities can be protected with autonomous sentries better than with 
humans.  
In addition to the sentry concept for logistic facilities, unmanned systems 
can also be used in convoy operations. Peters et al. (2011) also highlighted that 
surveillance and reconnaissance missions for logistic convoys, which are done 
with UAVs, are among the recent successful applications. Considering the 
proposed military and civilian applications referring to Green’s (2011) research, 
we can also say that unmanned UGVs would be used as logistic vehicles in the 
near future. The same technology can also be applied to UUVs and USVs. 
Another concept DHL (2015) mentioned was the small UAVs placed on top 
of delivery trucks. Particularly in military convoy operations, this small UAVs can 
automatically patrol critical points on the road for potential IEDs. It can also be 
helpful when detecting potential attackers who are hidden and waiting for the 
convoy to trigger the implanted IEDs.  
3. Other Positive Impacts of Unmanned Systems 
With the evolving nature of warfare, speed has become a crucial element in 
every aspect of warfare. Proving the role of autonomy on speed, the Defense 
Science Board also highlighted in its Summer Study on Autonomy that 
“employment of logistics autonomy can also be proactively used against an 
adversary. For example, speeding logistics helps get inside an adversary’s 
decision cycle” (DOD, 2016, p. 69). From the operational logistics perspective, 
troops having higher maneuver capability have defined the difference between 
victory and defeat. Also carrying effective weapons, vehicles, equipment and 
soldiers quickly to a critical geographical place is a feature most military 
commanders want. Certainly, speeding any process regarding logistics will make 
a difference, and unmanned systems are the key to it.    
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As we mentioned earlier, using unmanned systems in the military would 
cause significant cost and time efficiencies. However, in many cases, positive 
impacts of unmanned systems can be intertwined to each other. Specifically, time 
and cost efficiencies have an exponential effect on the other aspects of the 
defense industry. An example of this can be the relationship between impacts on 
acquisition processes and time efficiencies. It is clear that when acquisition 
processes get less complex, warfighters will be able to use newer technology 
without losing time. Higher technology in the field has usually meant more lives 
saved. In addition, Peterson and Staley’s (2011) and Denevan’s (2014) research 
on the cost efficiencies showed that there could be significant cost savings when 
Cargo UAVs were used. Another impact of unmanned systems is the change they 
do in operational planning. Without carrying a life, dangerous supply missions can 
be implemented vigorously by military leaders using unmanned systems. Even 
under fire, more than the necessary amount of critical supplies can be sent with 
more than one unmanned system (depending on the value of supplies); losing an 
unmanned system with its supply payload cannot be compared to a potential loss 
of any human lives. When significant cost efficiencies and exposing less risk are 
combined, inventory levels will also be decreased accordingly. This again will lead 
to significant cost savings.  
Unmanned systems, specifically UAVs, have also taken part in 
Humanitarian and Disaster Response (HADR) operations. Recent applications 
include mostly surveillance tasks.  
Another advantage for using unmanned systems in military logistics was 
eliminating human weaknesses. Militaries have started using these robotic 
technologies in dull, dirty, and dangerous jobs to decrease loss of human lives 
and improve the quality of certain military tasks. Because robots were not getting 
tired, hungry, or sad, they could implement the same tasks and maybe more of 
them with fewer and fewer errors. 
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C. NEGATIVE IMPACTS AND RISKS OF USING UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN 
MILITARY LOGISTICS 
In this part of our Analysis chapter, we addressed potential negative 
impacts and risks that unmanned systems might be exposed to. Without any 
doubt, unmanned systems have dramatically affected military logistic capabilities 
and acquisition processes in a positive way. However, these superior capabilities 
and advantages listed earlier in our study have come with a cost. As a general 
term, unmanned systems have high procurement costs for each system because 
they need intensive R&D studies and expenses. In addition, they are exposed to 
different kinds of risks such as cyber threats and safety issues. In our study, we 
evaluated negative impacts and risks of unmanned systems mainly from a general 
point of view because most vulnerabilities of unmanned systems would also be 
valid for military logistics applications. 
1. Cyber Attacks 
Today with the help of technological improvements, nations have become 
more and more dependent on information technology (Owens, Dam, & Lin, 2009). 
As nations understand the exponential pay-off their technological investments can 
make, governmental entities and private companies all around the world have 
tried to catch up with the Information Age’s requirements. However, these 
technological improvements have come with vulnerabilities that can be exploited 
because any device connected to the Internet is a possible target for adversaries. 
Owens et al. (2009) defined the cyberattack concept in their report Technology, 
Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack 
Capabilities. According to Owens et al. (2009), “cyberattack refers to deliberate 
actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or 
networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these 
systems or networks” (p. 1). There are different kinds of cyberattacks that can 
target computer systems and networks (Owens et al., 2009).  
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According to Defense Science Board Task Force Report (DOD, 2012), 
cyberattacks can vary from “denial of service to taking over command and control 
(C2) of the actual platforms” (p. 75). The Defense Science Board Task Force 
report also highlighted an important point that 
at best, current UxV requirements deal with traditional information 
assurance aspects and not defense against offensive cyberattacks. 
This threat is compounded by the affordability pressures to use 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and open source products in 
ground stations, and the increasing desire to network platforms and 
ground station locations. The dependence on commercial 
information technology hardware (processors, etc.) also exposes the 
UxV to the cyber vulnerabilities of the global supply chain. (DOD, 
2012, p. 75)  
Russon (2015) shared valuable information about cyberattacks in her 
article, “Wondering How to Hack a Military Drone? It’s All on Google.” In her 
article, she highlighted the risk of “GPS spoofing attacks” (para. 2). According to 
Russon (2015), “In 2011, a CIA stealth drone—or unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV)—was captured by Iranians, who hijacked its GPS coordinates and safely 
brought it down so that they could learn to reverse-engineer the technology for 
themselves” (para. 2). She also pointed out that this event took place 
approximately one month later than a paper called “On the Requirements for 
Successful GPS Spoofing Attacks was published by Nils Ole Tippenhauer and 
other academics from ETH Zurich and the University of California” (Russon, 2015, 
para. 3). The paper was explaining how to hack a military drone in detail, and 
soon afterward hackers used that information for hacking a drone (Russon, 2015). 
She also shared warning remarks from Kathleen Fisher who was the previous 
program manager of DARPA: “Cyberattacks on your PC—they can steal 
information and they can steal money, but they don't cause physical damage, 
whereas cyberattacks in a UAV or a car can cause physical damage and we really 
don't want to open that can of worms” (para. 12).  
Jesion (2002) specifically addressed unmanned military logistic 
applications. In his research, he highlighted that complex unmanned logistic 
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applications “might be vulnerable to disruption, spoofing, and interception” 
(Jesion, 2002, p. 15). If that happens, automated systems might provide 
unreliable or erroneous information regarding “demands for resupply, medical 
services, transportation, etc.” (Jesion, 2002, p. 15). 
2. Safety Issues / Limitations 
Although they are unmanned, unmanned systems are also open to 
vulnerabilities regarding safety issues like accidents and malfunctions that might 
cause casualties. Singer (2009) told the story of the first person in history to be 
killed by a robot in his book, Wired for War:  
January 25, 1979, was to be a special day for Robert Williams, a 
worker at Ford Motor Company’s Flat Rock casting plant in 
Michigan. The twenty-five-year-old man’s son was celebrating his 
second birthday. Unfortunately, it was also the same day that the 
robot operating an automated parts retrieval system near William’s 
workstation went on the fritz. In reaching out for a part, the robot’s 
arm swung up unexpectedly and smashed into the man’s head. 
(p. 195) 
Statistics also show the seriousness of safety issue. According to one 
survey, “American factories where robots are present found that 4% have had 
major robotic accidents” (Singer, 2009, p. 195). Singer (2009) also mentioned that 
in other industrialized countries, such as Japan and Britain, the same kinds of 
accidents have happened. He also added that as the unmanned technology 
advances, it becomes more complex and more vulnerable to accidents because it 
is quite possible for programmers to make a tiny mistake among thousands of 
lines of computer code. The history of unmanned systems is full of accidents and 
malfunctions, particularly a 1960 incident, which was among the most dangerous 
ones (Singer, 2009). According to Singer (2009), 
The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was a detection system 
based in Greenland that was to warn if the Soviets launched their 
nuclear missiles. On October 5, 1960, the system “detected” a 
launch “with a certainty of 99.9%.” North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) went on alert and prepared its retaliation. But 
with just minutes to spare, the military figured out that the Soviets 
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had not attacked; instead of flames from intercontinental ballistic 
missiles flying at the United States, the computer had detected the 
rising moon. It is fortunate for all humankind that this incident 
happened in October 1960, not two years later, which would have 
placed the computer’s mistake right in the middle of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, when fingers were more of a hair trigger. (p. 197) 
When the incidents in Singer (2009)’s book considered, it is obvious that 
accident and malfunction statistics might increase, depending on the level of 
autonomy in unmanned systems. In addition, if the authorities cannot take 
necessary precautions, unmanned systems will likely cause more casualties in the 
future. As discussed before in this section, nations are inclined to invest in 
advanced technologies like unmanned systems because of their strategic 
benefits. Particularly for UAVs, there is also a race between high-profit private 
companies. Militaries all around the world also use UAVs. Although airspaces can 
be regulated by relevant institutions by implementing specific corridors for 
different aerial vehicles, proliferating the number of UAVs increases the risk of 
possible accidents in the sky. Singer (2009) gave Baghdad as an example 
regarding the risks of unmanned systems because Baghdad has the most 
crowded airspace. “In one instance, an unmanned Raven drone plowed into a 
manned helicopter” (Singer, 2009, p. 202). In the absence of necessary 
regulations, the high number of UAVs might cause unwanted accidents with 
casualties.  
In his study, Peterson and Staley (2011) highlighted the susceptibility of 
Cargo UAVs to potential air-defense attacks: “Specifically, it may prove to be 
susceptible to small arms fire and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. This 
may result in high attrition rates, which could prove to be a major factor in the 
overall program cost” (p. 59). As a result, air-defense attacks might affect the 




V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Singer (2009) shared important information about Revolutions in Military 
Affairs (RMA) in Chapter 10 of his book, Wired for War, “The Big Cebrowski and 
the Real RMA: Thinking about Revolutionary Technologies.” To address RMAs, 
Singer (2009) pointed out that most people predict a linear approach, when it 
comes to the expectations about the possible changes regarding “business, 
technology, and war” (p. 181). “Every so often, however, a change comes along 
that wipes the table clean. It rewrites the rules, changes the players, and alters 
the organizations, strategies and tactics” (Singer, 2009, p. 181). He also said that 
“the parallel in business world is ‘disruptive technologies’ that fundamentally 
transform an industry, even to the point of ending it” (Singer, 2009, p. 181). When 
these fundamental changes occurred in military, Singer (2009) identified these 
improvements as RMAs.  
RMAs are basically the “introduction of a new technology or organization, 
which in turn creates a whole new model of fighting and winning wars” (Singer, 
2009, p. 181). According to Singer (2009), these RMAs would have “first, second 
and third order effects” (p. 181) on the society. He also mentioned that it is hard to 
understand what these effects might be when the technology is new. Singer 
(2009) provided new weapons as an example regarding the RMAs that were 
introduced. “A new weapon is introduced that makes obsolete all the previous 
best weapons, such as what armored, steam-powered warships did to wooden, 
wind-powered warships” (Singer, 2009, p. 181).  
According to Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the 21st century revolution 
was Network-Centric Warfare (Singer, 2009). Singer (2009) explained this 
concept: 
Central to the network-centric concept was, as the name suggests, 
the power of the network. That is, a network linked together would 
be quicker, smarter, and more lethal than the sum of its individual 
parts and would quickly overwhelm whatever foe lay in its path. This 
“information advantage,” argued Cebrowski, would be huge. The 
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sharing of information across the system, as well as the ability to 
crack into the enemy’s systems, would create “near-perfect” 
intelligence. The side that was networked would not only know 
exactly where its own soldiers were, so that they could be deployed 
to perfect efficiency, but it would also know where the enemy was, 
even better than the enemy troops’ own leaders (p. 184).  
On the other hand, Singer (2009) asserted that the real revolution of the 
21st century was not the Network-Centric Warfare. It was the robotic revolution 
because it would affect warfare more dramatically than well-maintained 
information technology (IT) networks in Network-Centric Warfare concept (Singer, 
2009). Science and technology are in incremental nature.  
In parallel with Singer (2009), we also considered that robotic (unmanned) 
technology as the 21st century’s real military revolution. However, it is also 
important to take into account that robotic technologies have already been 
nurtured by earlier technological improvements including the IT networks. In 
addition, recent concepts and improvements related to unmanned systems such 
as swarming and the increasing level of autonomy necessitate strong and well-
maintained IT networks. In this chapter, we provide information about our findings 
regarding the unmanned applications in military logistics. 
A. CONCLUSION 
Within the scope of military logistics, we sought answer to our primary 
research question: What are the current and potential uses of unmanned systems 
for military logistics? To answer this question, we also provided three secondary 
research questions that would help us to answer our primary research question in 
a step by step approach.  
In the literature review chapter of our thesis, we evaluated military logistics 
as a whole and found the main problematic areas in military logistics. We found 
that there were two main challenges of military logistics. These challenges were 
uncertainty and security. In addition, we also studied current and potential 
applications in civilian sector logistics.  
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Then, we answered our first secondary research question about unmanned 
applications in civilian sector logistics. According to our studies, the most 
advanced recent applications were industrial robotics at warehouses and 
distribution centers. Specifically, the case of Amazon Warehouses in this section 
showed us the economic race between private companies and the importance of 
cost efficiencies regarding inventory for them. Another important finding was the 
technological advances in UAV delivery in the civilian sector. Profitable private 
U.S. companies such as Amazon, Google, and Walmart have already invested 
significantly in UAV delivery technology; however, the potential applications were 
waiting for FAA approval. We also found out that the commercial UAV delivery 
concept has not been limited to commercial goods; some commercial companies 
were delivering blood and medical supplies.  
In the first section of our Analysis chapter, we studied the current and 
potential applications of unmanned systems in military logistics. According to our 
findings, most common unmanned applications already in use are convoy over-
watch missions with UAVs. It is also important to point out here that we also 
considered a parallel opinion with Peters et al.’s (2011) RAND report considering 
logistic convoy over-watch missions as logistics tasks for UAVs. In our K-MAX 
Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System case, we found out that the UAV delivery 
concept for military purposes was limited to the U.S. Marine Corps’ usage of K-
MAX Cargo UAVs in OEF in Afghanistan. K-MAX’s high payload capacity and the 
high risk of IED threats for ground convoys made this first operational attempt 
possible and afterwards it turned out successfully. For the UUVs and USVs, there 
were not current significant applications regarding military logistics. However, 
there have been UGV projects in the evaluation phase for logistic purposes as 
mentioned in our literature review. For the UUVs and USVs, various projects have 
been in the evaluation phase, but neither of them were related to logistics 
purposes. Logistic uses of UUVs and USVs have already been in conceptual 
phases. On the other hand, especially for UGVs, there have been current 
commercial applications that are in test period such as Google’s driverless cars 
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and Otto’s driverless trucks. These applications might have a pushing effect on 
the military technologies regarding driverless logistic convoys.  
In the second section of our Analysis chapter, we evaluated the impacts of 
unmanned systems to the acquisition costs of products compared to other 
delivery methods. According to our research, there have been substantial cost 
reductions with specific Cargo UAVs (K-MAX). Peterson and Staley’s (2011) and 
Denevan’s (2014) studies on the cost evaluations of Cargo UAVs were 
significantly valuable for our research. In addition, our research showed that 
unmanned systems have proven their positive impact on the slow moving 
acquisition system. Thirtle et al.’s (1997) RAND report, The Predator ACTD. A 
Case Study for Transition Planning to the Formal Acquisition Process, and 
Jones’s (2014) thesis report, An Analysis of the Defense Acquisition Strategy of 
Unmanned Systems, were important with their explanations regarding the impacts 
of unmanned systems to the acquisition processes.   
In the third section of our Analysis chapter, we evaluated the positive 
impacts of unmanned systems to military logistics. In this section, we specifically 
addressed the positive impacts of these systems on the military logistics 
challenges (uncertainty and security) that were mentioned before in our literature 
review chapter. Then we addressed general positive impacts under the other 
positive impacts of unmanned systems section. Regarding the positive impacts, 
we found out that 
 Unmanned systems have been decreasing personnel assigned to 
logistic facilities such as factories.  
 They have been decreasing uncertainty and inventory levels and 
increasing visibility and flow of information in the military supply 
chain.  
 They have been decreasing risks in logistic delivery tasks.  
 Urgent deliveries including medical supplies, ammunition, and 
gasoline might be implemented even with small UAVs with limited 
payload capabilities. 
 They have been providing significant time and cost efficiencies.  
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 They impacted acquisition processes in a positive way, making them 
more efficient. 
In the fourth section of our Analysis chapter, we evaluated the negative 
impacts of unmanned systems to military logistics. We evaluated these effects 
under two headings: cyberattacks and safety issues/limitations. According to our 
research,   
 Cyberattacks have been an important vulnerability for all computer-
based physical applications including all unmanned systems.  
 There have been reported accidents with casualties in both 
industrial unmanned applications and defensive applications with 
weapon systems.  
 Rapidly increasing the number of unmanned systems (especially 
UAVs) might cause accidents.  
 Cargo UAVs have been vulnerable to air-defense attacks.  
B. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this section of our Conclusion and Recommendations chapter, we 
address our recommendations regarding the use of unmanned systems in military 
logistics.  
 Countries should continue investing in R&D activities for unmanned 
systems. 
 Considering the high costs of inventory in both military and civilian 
logistics, R&D activities for unmanned systems should also be 
specified to military logistics applications, as well as other military 
applications.  
 Military officials should continue following civilian logistics 
applications and improvements related to unmanned systems.  
 Unmanned systems in civilian applications should be supported, and 
technology should be transferred between commercial and military 
entities. 
 Universities and commercial entrepreneurs should be continuously 
supported by governmental entities.  
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 Government officials should regularly seek logistics leaders’ 
opinions and feedback about current and proposed unmanned 
applications.  
 Safety standards for unmanned systems should be reevaluated until 
the accident statistics significantly drop.  
 End-user training programs should be considered and implemented 
continuously for system operators. 
 Unmanned systems technology should be evaluated with emerging 
technological applications such as 3D printers and network systems.  
 With the emerging concepts like swarming and human-machine 
interface studies, unmanned systems technology on military logistics 
should be reevaluated.  
 Necessary precautions against cyberattacks should be taken 
vigorously. Investments for more secure programming methods and 
autonomous cyber defensive technologies should be considered 
against cyberattacks.    
 Unmanned systems should be designed with a single power-off 
system linked to the operator with a diverse network system in case 
the control of the unmanned system was taken over with a 
cyberattack.    
 An electronic technology portal should be founded for safety 
standards. Incidents and experiences regarding safety should be 
used and shared between NATO member and/or partner countries.  
 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR) efforts of 
different countries should be combined in the scope of a common 
plan and exercises should be implemented.   
 Unmanned systems should be used in ammunition factories and 
storage facilities to decrease accidents.    
 With the advancing technology, existing military tactics and 
techniques should be reevaluated, such as delivery of an urgent 
supply (medical, ammunition, etc.) to a soldier under fire with small 
UAVs or equipping logistic convoys with small reconnaissance 
UAVs.    
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As we mentioned before in our Introduction chapter that our research was 
limited to unmanned industrial applications, UASs, UGSs, USVs, and UUVs for 
military logistic applications. However, there have been important advances in the 
unmanned cyber systems and unmanned space systems. 
In our research, we did not provide current logistics applications for both 
USVs and UUVs. However, quickly advancing unmanned technology might create 
USV and UUV applications and increase for military logistics purposes. Then new 
research should be conducted to evaluate these technologies.  
In addition, because of the timeliness of the topic, both commercial and 
military applications for unmanned systems might be updated in the light of 
emerging technological advances.  
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